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Abstract
A rapidly growing area of work has studied the ex-
istence of adversarial examples, datapoints which
have been perturbed to fool a classifier, but the
vast majority of these works have focused primar-
ily on threat models defined by `p norm-bounded
perturbations. In this paper, we propose a new
threat model for adversarial attacks based on the
Wasserstein distance. In the image classification
setting, such distances measure the cost of mov-
ing pixel mass, which naturally cover “standard”
image manipulations such as scaling, rotation,
translation, and distortion (and can potentially
be applied to other settings as well). To generate
Wasserstein adversarial examples, we develop a
procedure for projecting onto the Wasserstein ball,
based upon a modified version of the Sinkhorn it-
eration. The resulting algorithm can successfully
attack image classification models, bringing tra-
ditional CIFAR10 models down to 3% accuracy
within a Wasserstein ball with radius 0.1 (i.e.,
moving 10% of the image mass 1 pixel), and we
demonstrate that PGD-based adversarial training
can improve this adversarial accuracy to 76%. In
total, this work opens up a new direction of study
in adversarial robustness, more formally consid-
ering convex metrics that accurately capture the
invariances that we typically believe should ex-
ist in classifiers. Code for all experiments in the
paper is available at https://github.com/
locuslab/projected sinkhorn.
1. Introduction
A substantial effort in machine learning research has gone to-
wards studying adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014),
commonly described as datapoints that are indistinguishable
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Figure 1. A minimal example exemplifying the difference between
Wasserstein perturbations and `∞ perturbations on an image with
six pixels. The top example utilizes a perturbation ∆W to shift
the image one pixel to the right, which is small with respect to
Wasserstein distance since each pixel moved a minimal amount,
but large with respect to `∞ distance since each pixel changed
a maximal amount. In contrast, the bottom example utilizes a
perturbation ∆∞ which changes all pixels to be grayer. This is
small with respect to `∞ distance, since each pixel changes by a
small amount, but large with respect to Wasserstein distance, since
the mass on each pixel on the left had to move halfway across the
image to the right.
from “normal” examples, but are specifically perturbed to
be misclassified by machine learning systems. This notion
of indistinguishability, later described as the threat model
for attackers, was originally taken to be `∞ bounded pertur-
bations, which model a small amount of noise injected to
each pixel (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Since then, subsequent
work on understanding, attacking, and defending against
adversarial examples has largely focused on this `∞ threat
model and its corresponding `p generalization. While the `p
ball is a convenient source of adversarial perturbations, it is
by no means a comprehensive description of all possible ad-
versarial perturbations. Other work (Engstrom et al., 2017)
has looked at perturbations such as rotations and transla-
tions, but beyond these specific transforms, there has been
little work considering broad classes of attacks beyond the
`p ball.
In this paper, we propose a new type of adversarial pertur-
bation that encodes a general class of attacks that is funda-
mentally different from the `p ball. Specifically, we propose
an attack model where the perturbed examples are bounded
in Wasserstein distance from the original example. This
distance can be intuitively understood for images as the
cost of moving around pixel mass to move from one image
to another. Note that the Wasserstein ball and the `p ball
can be quite different in their allowable perturbations: ex-
amples that are close in Wasserstein distance can be quite
far in `p distance, and vice versa (a pedagogical example
demonstrating this is in Figure 1).
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We develop this idea of Wasserstein adversarial examples
in two main ways. Since adversarial examples are typi-
cally best generated using variants of projected gradient
descent, we first derive an algorithm that projects onto the
Wasserstein ball. However, performing an exact projection
is computationally expensive, so our main contribution here
is to derive a fast method for approximate projection. The
procedure can be viewed as a modified Sinkhorn iteration,
but with a more complex set of update equations. Second,
we develop efficient methods for adversarial training un-
der this threat method. Because this involves repeatedly
running this projection within an inner optimization loop,
speedups that use a local transport plan are particularly cru-
cial (i.e. only moving pixel mass to nearby pixels), making
the projection complexity linear in the image size.
We evaluate the attack quality on standard models, showing
for example that we can reduce the adversarial accuracy of
a standard CIFAR10 classifier from 94.7% to 3% using a
Wasserstein ball of radius 0.1 (equivalent to moving 10%
of the mass of the image by one pixel), whereas the same
attack reduces the adversarial accuracy of a model certi-
fiably trained against `∞ perturbations from 66% to 61%.
In contrast, we show that with adversarial training, we are
able to improve the adversarial accuracy of this classifier
to 76% while retaining a nominal accuracy of 80.7%. We
additionally show, however, that existing certified defenses
cannot be easily extended to this setting; building models
provably robust to Wasserstein attacks will require funda-
mentally new techniques. In total, we believe this work
highlights a new direction in adversarial examples: convex
perturbation regions which capture a much more intuitive
form of structure in their threat model, and which move
towards a more “natural” notion of adversarial attacks.
2. Background and Related Work
Much of the work in adversarial examples has focused on
the original `∞ threat model presented by Goodfellow et al.
(2015), some of which also extends naturally to `p pertur-
bations. Since then, there has been a plethora of papers
studying this threat model, ranging from improved attacks,
heuristic and certified defenses, and verifiers. As there are
far too many to discuss here, we highlight a few which are
the most relevant to this work.
The most commonly used method for generating adversarial
examples is to use a form of projected gradient descent over
the region of allowable perturbations, originally referred to
as the Basic Iterative Method (Kurakin et al., 2017). Since
then, there has been a back-and-forth of new heuristic de-
fenses followed by more sophisticated attacks. To name a
few, distillation was proposed as a defense but was defeated
(Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), realistic
transformations seen by vehicles were thought to be safe un-
til more robust adversarial examples were created (Lu et al.,
2017; Athalye et al., 2018b), and many defenses submitted
to ICLR 2018 were broken before the review period even
finished (Athalye et al., 2018a). One undefeated heuristic
defense is to use the adversarial examples in adversarial
training, which has so far worked well in practice (Madry
et al., 2018). While this method has traditionally been used
for `∞ and `2 balls (and has a natural `p generalization), in
principle, the method can be used to project onto any kind
of perturbation region.
Another set of related papers are verifiers and provable
defenses, which aim to produce (or train on) certificates
that are provable guarantees of robustness against adver-
sarial attacks. Verification methods are now applicable
to multi-layer neural networks using techniques ranging
from semi-definite programming relaxations (Raghunathan
et al., 2018), mixed integer linear programming (Tjeng
et al., 2019), and duality (Dvijotham et al., 2018). Prov-
able defenses are able to tie verification into training non-
trivial deep networks by backpropagating through certifi-
cates, which are generated with duality-based bounds (Wong
& Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018), abstract interpreta-
tions (Mirman et al., 2018), and interval bound propagation
(Gowal et al., 2018). These methods have subsequently
inspired new heuristic training defenses, where the resulting
models can be independently verified as robust (Croce et al.,
2018; Xiao et al., 2019). Notably, some of these approaches
are not overly reliant on specific types of perturbations (e.g.
duality-based bounds). Despite their generality, these cer-
tificates have only been trained and evaluated in the context
of `∞ and `2 balls, and we believe this is due in large part
to a lack of alternatives.
Highly relevant to this work are attacks that lie outside the
traditional `p ball of imperceptible noise. For example, sim-
ple rotations and translations form a fairly limited set of
perturbations that can be quite large in `p norm, but are
sometimes sufficient in order to fool classifiers (Engstrom
et al., 2017). On the other hand, adversarial examples that
work in the real world do not necessarily conform to the no-
tion of being “imperceptible”, and need to utilize a stronger
adversary that is visible to real world systems. Some exam-
ples include wearing adversarial 3D printed glasses to fool
facial recognition (Sharif et al., 2017), the use of adversarial
graffiti to attack traffic sign classification (Eykholt et al.,
2018), and printing adversarial textures on objects to attack
image classifiers (Athalye et al., 2018b). While Sharif et al.
(2017) allows perturbations that are physical glasses, the
others use an `p threat model with a larger radius, when a
different threat model could be a more natural description
of adversarial examples that are perceptible on camera.
Last but not least, our paper relies heavily on the Wasserstein
distance, which has seen applications throughout machine
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learning. The traditional notion of Wasserstein distance has
the drawback of being computationally expensive: com-
puting a single distance involves solving an optimal trans-
port problem (a linear program) with a number of variables
quadratic in the dimension of the inputs. However, it was
shown that by subtracting an entropy regularization term,
one can compute approximate Wasserstein distances ex-
tremely quickly using the Sinkhorn iteration (Cuturi, 2013),
which was later shown to run in near-linear time (Altschuler
et al., 2017). Relevant but orthogonal to our work, is that
of Sinha et al. (2018) on achieving distributional robust-
ness using the Wasserstein distance. While we both use the
Wasserstein distance in the context of adversarial training,
the approach is quite different: Sinha et al. (2018) use the
Wasserstein distance to perturb the underlying data distribu-
tion, whereas we use the Wasserstein distance as an attack
model for perturbing each example.
Contributions This paper takes a step back from using `p
as a perturbation metric, and proposes using the Wasserstein
distance instead as an equivalently general but qualitatively
different way of generating adversarial examples. To tackle
the computational complexity of projecting onto a Wasser-
stein ball, we use ideas from the Sinkhorn iteration (Cuturi,
2013) to derive a fast method for an approximate projection.
Specifically, we show that subtracting a similar entropy-
regularization term to the projection problem results in a
Sinkhorn-like algorithm, and using local transport plans
makes the procedure tractable for generating adversarial
images. In contrast to `∞ and `2 perturbations, we find
that the Wasserstein metric generates adversarial examples
whose perturbations have inherent structure reflecting the
actual image itself (see Figure 2 for a comparison). We
demonstrate the efficacy of this attack on standard models,
models trained against this attack, and provably robust mod-
els (against `∞ attacks) on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
While the last of these models are not trained to be robust
specifically against this attack, we observe that that some
(but not all) robustness empirically transfers over to pro-
tection against the Wasserstein attack. More importantly,
we show that while the Wasserstein ball does fit naturally
into duality based frameworks for generating and training
against certificates, there is a fundamental roadblock pre-
venting these methods from generating non-vacuous bounds
on Wasserstein balls.
3. Preliminaries
PGD-based adversarial attacks The most common
method of creating adversarial examples is to use a vari-
ation of projected gradient descent. Specifically, let (x, y)
be a datapoint and its label, and let B(x, ) be some ball
around x with radius , which represents the threat model
for the adversary. We first define the projection operator
+ =
+ =
0 1 −1 1 0 1
Figure 2. A comparison of a Wasserstein (top) vs an `∞ (bottom)
adversarial example for an MNIST classifier (for  = 0.4 and
0.3 respectively), showing the original image (left), the added
perturbation (middle), and the final perturbed image (right). We
find that the Wasserstein perturbation has a structure reflecting
the actual content of the image, whereas the `∞ perturbation also
attacks the background pixels.
onto B(x, ) to be
proj
B(x,)
(w) = arg min
z∈B(x,)
‖w − z‖22 (1)
which finds the point closest (in Euclidean space) to the
input w that lies within the ball B(x, ). Then, for some
step size α and some loss ` (e.g. cross-entropy loss), the
algorithm consists of the following iteration:
x(t+1) = proj
B(x,)
(
x(t) + arg max
‖v‖≤α
vT∇`(x(t), y)
)
(2)
where x(0) = x or any randomly initialized point within
B(x, ). This is sometimes referred to as projected steepest
descent, which is used to generated adversarial examples
since the standard gradient steps are typically too small. If
we consider the `∞ ball B∞(x, ) = {x+ ∆ : ‖∆‖∞ ≤ }
and use steepest descent with respect to the `∞ norm, then
we recover the Basic Iterative Method originally presented
by Kurakin et al. (2017).
Adversarial training One of the heuristic defenses that
works well in practice is to use adversarial training with
a PGD adversary. Specifically, instead of minimizing the
loss evaluated at a example x, we minimize the loss on
an adversarially perturbed example xadv, where xadv is
obtained by running the projected gradient descent attack
for the ball B(x, ) for some number of iterations, as shown
in Algorithm 1. Taking B(x, ) to be an `∞ ball recovers
the procedure used by Madry et al. (2018).
Wasserstein distance Finally, we define the most crucial
component of this work, an alternative metric from `p dis-
tances. The Wasserstein distance (also referred to as the
Earth mover’s distance) is an optimal transport problem that
can be intuitively understood in the context of distributions
as the minimum cost of moving probability mass to change
one distribution into another. When applied to images, this
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Algorithm 1 An epoch of adversarial training for a loss
function `, classifier fθ with parameters θ, and step size
parameter α for some ball B.
input: Training data (xi, yi), i = 1 . . . n
for i = 1 . . . n do
// Run PGD adversary
xadv := xi
for t = 1 . . . T do
δ := arg max‖v‖≤α v
T∇`(xadv, yi)
xadv := projB(xi,) (xadv + δ)
end for
// Backpropagate with xadv , e.g. with SGD
Update θ with∇`(fθ(xadv), yi)
end for
can be interpreted as the cost of moving pixel mass from
one pixel to another another, where the cost increases with
distance.
More specifically, let x, y ∈ Rn+ be two non-negative data
points such that
∑
i xi =
∑
j yj = 1, so images and other
inputs need to be normalized, and let C ∈ Rn×n+ be some
non-negative cost matrix where Cij encodes the cost of
moving mass from xi to yj . Then, the Wasserstein distance
dW between x and y is defined to be
dW(x, y) = min
Π∈Rn×n+
〈Π, C〉
subject to Π1 = x, ΠT 1 = y
(3)
where the minimization over transport plans Π, whose en-
tries Πij encode how the mass moves from xi to yj . Then,
we can define the Wasserstein ball with radius  as
BW(x, ) = {x+ ∆ : dW(x, x+ ∆) ≤ } (4)
4. Wasserstein Adversarial Examples
The crux of this work relies on offering a fundamentally
different type of adversarial example from typical, `p per-
turbations: the Wasserstein adversarial example.
4.1. Projection onto the Wasserstein Ball
In order to generate Wasserstein adversarial examples, we
can run the projected gradient descent attack from Equation
(2), dropping in the Wasserstein ball BW from Equation
(4) in place of B. However, while projections onto regions
such as `∞ and `2 balls are straightforward and have closed
form computations, simply computing the Wasserstein dis-
tance itself requires solving an optimization problem. Thus,
the first natural requirement to generating Wasserstein ad-
versarial examples is to derive an efficient way to project
examples onto a Wasserstein ball of radius . Specifically,
projecting w onto the Wasserstein ball around x with radius
 and transport cost matrix C can be written as solving the
following optimization problem:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
1
2
‖w − z‖22
subject to Π1 = x, ΠT 1 = z
〈Π, C〉 ≤ 
(5)
While we could directly solve this optimization problem
(using an off-the-shelf quadratic programming solver), this
is prohibitively expensive to do for every iteration of pro-
jected gradient descent, especially since there is a quadratic
number of variables. However, Cuturi (2013) showed that
the standard Wasserstein distance problem from Equation
(3) can be approximately solved efficiently by subtracting
an entropy regularization term on the transport plan W , and
using the Sinkhorn-Knopp matrix scaling algorithm. Mo-
tivated by these results, instead of solving the projection
problem in Equation (5) exactly, the key contribution that
allows us to do the projection efficiently is to instead solve
the following entropy-regularized projection problem:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
1
2
‖w − z‖22 +
1
λ
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij)
subject to Π1 = x, ΠT 1 = z
〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
(6)
Although this is an approximate projection onto the Wasser-
stein ball, importantly, the looseness in the approximation is
only in finding the projection z which is closest (in `2 norm)
to the original example x. All feasible points, including the
optimal solution, are still within the actual -Wasserstein
ball, so examples generated using the approximate projec-
tion are still within the Wasserstein threat model.
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we can introduce
dual variables (α, β, ψ) and derive an equivalent dual prob-
lem in Lemma 3 (the proof is deferred to Appendix A.1).
Lemma 1. The dual of the entropy-regularized Wasserstein
projection problem in Equation (6) is
maximize
α,β∈Rn,ψ∈R+
g(α, β, ψ) (7)
where
g(α, β, ψ) =− 1
2λ
‖β‖22 − ψ+ αTx+ βTw
−
∑
ij
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
(8)
Note that the dual problem here differs from the traditional
dual problem for Sinkhorn iterates by having an additional
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quadratic term on β and an additional dual variable ψ.
Nonetheless, we can still derive a Sinkhorn-like algorithm
by performing block coordinate ascent over the dual vari-
ables (the full derivation can be found in Appendix A.3).
Specifically, maximizing g with respect to α results in
arg max
αi
g(α, β, ψ) =
log (xi)− log
∑
j
exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
 , (9)
which is identical (up to a log transformation of variables)
to the original Sinkhorn iterate proposed in Cuturi (2013).
The maximization step for β can also be done analytically
with
arg max
βj
g(α, β, ψ) =
λwj −W
(
λ exp(λwj)
∑
i
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1)
)
(10)
whereW is the LambertW function, which is defined as the
inverse of f(x) = xex. Finally, since ψ cannot be solved
for analytically, we can perform the following Newton step
ψ′ = ψ − t · ∂g/∂ψ
∂2g/∂ψ2
(11)
where
∂g/∂ψ = −+
∑
ij
exp(αi)Cij exp(−ψCij) exp(βj)
∂2g/∂ψ2 = −
∑
ij
exp(αi)C
2
ij exp(−ψCij) exp(βj)
(12)
and where t is small enough such that ψ′ ≥ 0. Once we
have solved the dual problem, we can recover the primal
solution (to get the actual projection), which is described in
Lemma 4 and proved in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2. Suppose α∗, β∗, ψ∗ maximize the dual problem
g in Equation (16). Then,
z∗i = wi − βi/λ
Π∗ij = exp(α
∗
i ) exp(−ψ∗Cij − 1) exp(β∗j )
(13)
are the corresponding solutions that minimize the primal
problem in Equation (6).
The whole algorithm can then be vectorized and imple-
mented as Algorithm 2, which we call projected Sinkhorn
iterates. The algorithm uses a simple line search to ensure
that the constraint ψ ≥ 0 is not violated. Each iteration
has 8 O(n2) operations (matrix-vector product or matrix-
matrix element-wise product), in comparison to the original
Sinkhorn iteration which has 2 matrix-vector products.
Algorithm 2 Projected Sinkhorn iteration to project x onto
the  Wasserstein ball around y. We use · to denote element-
wise multiplication. The log and exp operators also apply
element-wise.
input: x,w ∈ Rn, C ∈ Cn×n, λ ∈ R
Initialize αi, βi := log(1/n) for i = 1, . . . , n and ψ := 1
u, v := exp(α), exp(β)
while α, β, ψ not converged do
// update K
Kψ := exp(−ψC − 1)
// block coordinate descent iterates
α := log(x)− log(Kψv)
u := exp(α)
β := λw −W (uTKψ · λ exp(λw))
v := exp(β)
// Newton step
g := −+ uT (C ·Kψ)v
h := −uT (C · C ·Kψ)v
// ensure ψ ≥ 0
α := 1
while ψ − αg/h < 0 do
α := α/2
end while
ψ := ψ − αg/h
end while
return: w − β/λ
Matrix scaling interpretation The original Sinkhorn it-
eration has a natural interpretation as a matrix scaling al-
gorithm, iteratively rescaling the rows and columns of a
matrix to achieve the target distributions. The Projected
Sinkhorn iteration has a similar interpretation: while the
α step rescales the rows of exp(−ψC − 1) to sum to x,
the β step rescales the columns of exp(−ψC − 1) to sum
to −β/λ + w, which is the primal transformation of the
projected variable z at optimality as described in Lemma
4. Lastly, the ψ step can be interpreted as correcting for
the transport cost of the current scaling: the numerator of
the Newton step is simply the difference between the trans-
port cost of the current matrix scaling and the maximum
constraint . A full derivation of the algorithm and a more
detailed explanation on this interpretation can be found in
Appendix A.3.
4.2. Local Transport Plans
The quadratic runtime dependence on input dimension can
grow quickly, and this is especially true for images. Rather
than allowing transport plans to move mass to and from
any pair of pixels, we instead restrict the transport plan to
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Table 1. Classification accuracies for models used in the experi-
ments.
DATA SET MODEL NOMINAL ACCURACY
MNIST STANDARD 98.90%
BINARIZE 98.73%
ROBUST 98.20%
ADV. TRAINING 96.95%
CIFAR10 STANDARD 94.70%
ROBUST 66.33%
ADV. TRAINING 80.69%
move mass only within a k × k region of the originating
pixel, similar in spirit to a convolutional filter. As a result,
the cost matrix C only needs to define the cost within a
k×k region, and we can utilize tools used for convolutional
filters to efficiently apply the cost to each k × k region.
This reduces the computational complexity of each iteration
to O(nk2). For images with more than one channel, we
can use the same transport plan for each channel and only
allow transport within a channel, so the cost matrix remains
k × k. For 5 × 5 local transport plans on CIFAR10, the
projected Sinkhorn iterates typically converge in around
30-40 iterations, taking about 0.02 seconds per iteration
on a Titan X for minibatches of size 100. Note that if we
use a cost matrix C that reflects the 1-Wasserstein distance,
then this problem could be solved even more efficiently
using Kantrovich duality, however we use this formulation
to enable more general p-Wasserstein distances, or even
non-standard cost matrices.
Projected gradient descent on the Wasserstein ball
With local transport plans, the method is fast enough to be
used within a projected gradient descent routine to generate
adversarial examples on images, and further used for ad-
versarial training as in Algorithm 1 (using steepest descent
with respect to `∞ norm), except that we do an approximate
projection onto the Wasserstein ball using Algorithm 2.
5. Results
In this section, we run the Wasserstein examples through
a range of typical experiments in the literature of adver-
sarial examples. Table 1 summarizes the nominal er-
ror rates obtained by all considered models. All exper-
iments can be run on a single GPU, and all code for
the experiments is available at https://github.com/
locuslab/projected sinkhorn.
Architectures For MNIST we used the convolutional
ReLU architecture used in Wong & Kolter (2018), with
two convolutional layers with 16 and 32 4× 4 filters each,
followed by a fully connected layer with 100 units, which
achieves a nominal accuracy of 98.89%. For CIFAR10 we
+ =
standard,  = 0.53
binary,  = 0.44
`∞ robust,  = 0.78
adv. training,  = 0.86
Figure 3. Wasserstein adversarial examples on the MNIST dataset
for the four different models. Note that the `∞ robust and the
adversarially trained models require a much larger  radius for
the Wasserstein ball in order to generate an adversarial example.
Each model classifies the corresponding perturbed example as an 8
instead of a 5, except for the first one which classifies the perturbed
example as a 6.
focused on the standard ResNet18 architecture (He et al.,
2016), which achieves a nominal accuracy of 94.76%.
Hyperparameters For all experiments in this section, we
focused on using 5× 5 local transport plans for the Wasser-
stein ball, and used an entropy regularization constant of
1000 for MNIST and 3000 for CIFAR10. The cost matrix
used for transporting between pixels is taken to be the 2-
norm of the distance in pixel space (e.g. the cost of going
from pixel (i, j) to (k, l) is
√|i− j|2 + |k − l|2), which
makes the optimal transport cost a metric more formally
known as the 1-Wasserstein distance. For more extensive
experiments on using different sizes of transport plans, dif-
ferent regularization constants, and different cost matrices,
we direct the reader to Appendix C.
Evaluation at test time We use the follow evaluation pro-
cedure to attack models with projected gradient descent on
the Wasserstein ball. For each MNIST example, we start
with  = 0.3 and increase it by a factor of 1.1 every 10
iterations until either an adversarial example is found or
until 200 iterations have passed, allowing for a maximum
perturbation radius of  = 2. For CIFAR10, we start with
 = 0.001 and increase it by a factor of 1.17 until either
and adversarial example is found or until 400 iterations
have passed, allowing for a maximum perturbation radius
of  = 0.53.
5.1. MNIST
For MNIST, we consider a standard model, a model with
binarization, a model provably robust to `∞ perturbations
of at most  = 0.1, and an adversarially trained model. We
provide a visual comparison of the Wasserstein adversarial
examples generated on each of the four models in Figure
3. The susceptibility of all four models to the Wasserstein
attack is plotted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Adversarial accuracy of various models on MNIST when
attacked by a Wasserstein adversary over varying sizes of -
Wasserstein balls. We find that all models not trained with adver-
sarial training against this attack eventually achieve 0% accuracy,
however we do observe that models trained to be provably ro-
bust against `∞ perturbations are still somewhat more robust than
standard models, or models utilizing binarization as a defense.
Standard model and binarization For MNIST, despite
restricting the transport plan to local 5× 5 regions, a stan-
dard model is easily attacked by Wasserstein adversarial
examples. In Figure 4, we see that Wasserstein attacks with
 = 0.5 can successfully attack a typical MNIST classifier
50% of the time, which goes up to 94% for  = 1. A Wasser-
stein radius of  = 0.5 can be intuitively understood as mov-
ing 50% of the pixel mass over by 1 pixel, or alternatively
moving less than 50% of the pixel mass more than 1 pixel.
Furthermore, while preprocessing images with binarization
is often seen as a way to trivialize adversarial examples on
MNIST, we find that it performs only marginally better than
the standard model against Wasserstein perturbations.
`∞ robust model We also run the attack on the model
trained by Wong et al. (2018), which is guaranteed to be
provably robust against `∞ perturbations with  ≤ 0.1.
While not specifically trained against Wasserstein perturba-
tions, in Figure 4 we find that it is substantially more robust
than either the standard or the binarized model, requiring a
significantly larger  to have the same attack success rate.
Adversarial training Finally, we apply this attack as an
inner procedure within an adversarial training framework
for MNIST. To save on computation, during training we
adopt a weaker adversary and use only 50 iterations of pro-
jected gradient descent. We also let  grow within a range
and train on the first adversarial example found (essentially
a budget version of the attack used at test time). Specific
details regarding this  schedule and also the learning pa-
rameters used can be found in Appendix B.1. We find that
the adversarially trained model is empirically the most well
defended against this attack of all four models, and cannot
be attacked down to 0% accuracy (Figure 4).
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Figure 5. Adversarial accuracy of various models on the CIFAR10
dataset when attacked by a Wasserstein adversary. We find that the
model trained to be provably robust against `∞ perturbations is not
as robust as adversarial training against a Wasserstein adversary.
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Figure 6. Wasserstein adversarial examples for CIFAR10 on a typ-
ical ResNet18 for all 10 classes. The perturbations here represents
the total change across all three channels, where total change is
plotted within the range ±0.165 (the maximum total change ob-
served in a single pixel) for images scaled to [0,1].
5.2. CIFAR10
For CIFAR10, we consider a standard model, a model prov-
ably robust to `∞ perturbations of at most  = 2/255, and
an adversarially trained model. We plot the susceptibility of
each model to the Wasserstein attack in Figure 5.
Standard model We find that for a standard ResNet18
CIFAR10 classifier, a perturbation radius of as little as 0.01
is enough to misclassify 25% of the examples, while a radius
of 0.1 is enough to fool the classifier 97% of the time (Figure
5). Despite being such a small , we see in Figure 6 that the
structure of the perturbations still reflect the actual content of
the images, though certain classes require larger magnitudes
of change than others.
`∞ robust model We further empirically evaluate the at-
tack on a model that was trained to be provably robust
against `∞ perturbations. We use the models weights from
Wong et al. (2018), which are trained to be provably robust
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against `∞ perturbations of at most  = 2/255. Further
note that this CIFAR10 model actually is a smaller ResNet
than the ResNet18 architecture considered in this paper, and
consists of 4 residual blocks with 16, 16, 32, and 64 fil-
ters. Nonetheless, we find that while the model suffers from
poor nominal accuracy (achieving only 66% accuracy on
unperturbed examples as noted in Table 1), the robustness
against `∞ attacks remarkably seems to transfer quite well
to robustness against Wasserstein attacks in the CIFAR10
setting, achieving 61% adversarial accuracy for  = 0.1 in
comparison to 3% for the standard model.
Adversarial training To perform adversarial training for
CIFAR10, we use a similar scheme to that used for MNIST:
we adopt a weaker adversary that uses only 50 iterations
of projected gradient descent during training and allow 
to grow within a range (specific details can be found in
Appendix B.2). We find that adversarial training here is also
able to defend against this attack, and at the same threshold
of  = 0.1, we find that the adversarial accuracy has been
improved from 3% to 76%.
5.3. Provable Defenses against Wasserstein
Perturbations
Lastly, we present some analysis on how this attack fits into
the context of provable defenses, along with a negative result
demonstrating a fundamental gap that needs to be solved.
The Wasserstein attack can be naturally incorporated into
duality based defenses: Wong et al. (2018) show that to use
their certificates to defend against other inputs, one only
needs to solve the following optimization problem:
max
x∈B(x,)
−xT y (14)
for some constant y and for some perturbation region
B(x, ) (a similar approach can be taken to adapt the dual
verification from Dvijotham et al. (2018)). For the Wasser-
stein ball, this is highly similar to the problem of projecting
onto the Wasserstein ball from Equation (6), with a linear
objective instead of a quadratic objective and fewer vari-
ables. In fact, a Sinkhorn-like algorithm can be derived to
solve this problem, which ends up being a simplified version
of Algorithm 2 (this is shown in Appendix D).
However, there is a fundamental obstacle towards generat-
ing provable certificates against Wasserstein attacks: these
defenses (and many other, non-duality based approaches)
depend heavily on propagating interval bounds from the in-
put space through the network, in order to efficiently bound
the output of ReLU units. This concept is inherently at odds
with the notion of Wasserstein distance: a “small” Wasser-
stein ball can use a low-cost transport plan to move all the
mass at a single pixel to its neighbors, or vice versa. As a
result, when converting a Wasserstein ball to interval con-
straints, the interval bounds immediately become vacuous:
each individual pixel can attain their minimum or maximum
value under some  cost transport plan. In order to guarantee
robustness against Wasserstein adversarial attacks, signifi-
cant progress must be made to overcome this limitation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new, general threat model
for adversarial examples based on the Wasserstein distance,
a metric that captures a kind of perturbation that is fun-
damentally different from traditional `p perturbations. To
generate these examples, we derived an algorithm for fast,
approximate projection onto the Wasserstein ball that can
use local transport plans for even more speedup on im-
ages. We successfully attacked standard networks, showing
that these adversarial examples are structurally perturbed
according to the content of the image, and demonstrated
the empirical effectiveness of adversarial training. Finally,
we observed that networks trained to be provably robust
against `∞ attacks are more robust than the standard net-
works against Wasserstein attacks, however we show that
the current state of provable defenses is insufficient to di-
rectly apply to the Wasserstein ball due to their reliance on
interval bounds.
We believe overcoming this roadblock is crucial to the de-
velopment of verifiers or provable defenses against not just
the Wasserstein attack, but also to improve the robustness of
classifiers against other attacks that do not naturally convert
to interval bounds (e.g. `0 or `1 attacks). Whether we can
develop efficient verification or provable training methods
that do not rely on interval bounds remains an open question.
Perhaps the most natural future direction for this work is to
begin to understand the properties of Wasserstein adversarial
examples and what we can do to mitigate them, even if
only at a heuristic level. However, at the end of the day,
the Wasserstein threat model defines just one example of a
convex region capturing structure that is different from `p
balls. By no means have we characterized all reasonable
adversarial perturbations, and so a significant gap remains
in determining how to rigorously define general classes
of adversarial examples that can characterize phenomena
different from the `p and Wasserstein balls.
Finally, although we focused primarily on adversarial exam-
ples in this work, the method of projecting onto Wasserstein
balls may be applicable outside of deep learning. Projec-
tion operators play a major role in optimization algorithms
beyond projected gradient descent (e.g. ADMM and alter-
nating projections). Perhaps even more generally, the tech-
niques in this paper could be used to derive Sinkhorn-like
algorithms for classes of problems that consider Wasserstein
constrained variables.
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A. Projected Sinkhorn derivation
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. The dual of the entropy-regularized Wasserstein
projection problem in Equation (6) is
maximize
α,β∈Rn,ψ∈R+
g(α, β, ψ) (15)
where
g(α, β, ψ) =− 1
2λ
‖β‖22 − ψ+ αTx+ βTw
−
∑
ij
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
(16)
Proof. For convenience, we multiply the objective by λ and
solve this problem instead:
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij)
subject to Π1 = x
ΠT 1 = z
〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
(17)
Introducing dual variables (α, β, ψ) where ψ ≥ 0, the La-
grangian is
L(z,Π, α, β, ψ)
=
λ
2
‖w − z‖22 +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij) + ψ(〈Π, C〉 − )
+ αT (x−Π1) + βT (z −ΠT 1).
(18)
The KKT optimality conditions are now
∂L
∂Πij
= ψCij + (1 + log(Πij))− αi − βj = 0
∂L
∂zj
= λ(zj − wj) + βj = 0
(19)
so at optimality, we must have
Πij = exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
z = −β
λ
+ w
(20)
Plugging in the optimality conditions, we get
L(z∗,Π∗, α, β, ψ)
=− 1
2λ
‖β‖22 − ψ+ αTx+ βTw
−
∑
ij
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
=g(α, β, ψ)
(21)
so the dual problem is to maximize g over α, β, ψ ≥ 0.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Suppose α∗, β∗, ψ∗ maximize the dual problem
g in Equation (16). Then,
z∗i = wi − βi/λ
Π∗ij = exp(α
∗
i ) exp(−ψ∗Cij − 1) exp(β∗j )
(22)
are the corresponding solutions that minimize the primal
problem in Equation (6).
Proof. These equations follow directly from the KKT opti-
mality conditions from Equation (20).
A.3. Algorithm derivation and interpretation
Derivation To derive the algorithm, note that since this is
a strictly convex problem to get the α and β iterates we solve
for setting the gradient to 0. The derivative with respect to
α is
∂g
∂αi
= xi − exp(αi)
∑
j
exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj) (23)
and so setting this to 0 and solving for αi gives the α iterate.
The derivative with respect to β is
∂g
∂βj
= − 1
λ
β+w− exp(βj)
∑
i
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij−1)
(24)
and setting this to 0 and solving for βj gives the β iterate
(this step can be done using a symbolic solver, we used
Mathematica). Lastly, the ψ updates are straightforward
scalar calculations of the derivative and second derivative.
Interpretation Recall from the transformation of dual to
primal variables from Lemma 4. To see how the Projected
Sinkhorn iteration is a (modified) matrix scaling algorithm,
we can interpret these quantities before optimality as primal
iterates. Namely, at each iteration t, let
z
(t)
i = wi − β(t)i /λ
Π
(t)
ij = exp(α
(t)) exp(−ψ(t)Cij − 1) exp(β(t))
(25)
Then, since the α and β steps are equivalent to setting Equa-
tions (23) and (24) to 0, we know that after an update for
α(t), we have that
xi =
∑
j
Π
(t)
ij (26)
so the α step rescales the transport matrix to sum to x.
Similarly, after an update for β(t), we have that
z
(t)
i =
∑
i
Π
(t)
ij (27)
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which is a rescaling of the transport matrix to sum to the
projected value. Lastly, the numerator of the ψ(t) step can
be rewritten as
ψ(t+1) = ψ(t) + t · 〈Π
(t), C〉 − 
〈Π(t), C · C〉 (28)
as a simple adjustment based on whether the current trans-
port plan Π(t) is above or below the maximum threshold
.
B. Experimental setup
B.1. MNIST
Adaptive  During adversarial training for MNIST, we
adopt an adaptive  scheme to avoid selecting a specific .
Specifically, to find an adversarial example, we first let  =
0.1 on the first iteration of projected gradient descent, and
increase it by a factor of 1.4 every 5 iterations. We terminate
the projected gradient descent algorithm when either an
adversarial example is found, or when 50 iterations have
passed, allowing  to take on values in the range [0.1, 2.1]
Optimizer hyperparameters To update the model
weights during adversarial training, we use the SGD op-
timizer with 0.9 momentum and 0.0005 weight decay, and
batch sizes of 128. We begin with a learning rate of 0.1,
reduce it to 0.01 after 10 epochs.
B.2. CIFAR10
Adaptive  We also use an adaptive  scheme for adver-
sarial training in CIFAR10. Specifically, we let  = 0.01 on
the first iteration of projected gradient descent, and increase
it by a factor of 1.5 every 5 iterations. Similar to MNIST,
we terminate the projected gradient descent algorithm when
either an adversarial example is found, or 50 iterations have
passed, allowing  to take on values in the range [0.01, 0.38].
Optimizer hyperparameters Similar to MNIST, to up-
date the model weights, we use the SGD optimizer with 0.9
momentum and 0.0005 weight decay, and batch sizes of 128.
The learning rate is also the same as in MNIST, starting at
0.1, and reducing to 0.01 after 10 epochs.
B.3. Motivation for adaptive 
A commonly asked question of models trained to be robust
against adversarial examples is “what if the adversary has a
perturbation budget of + δ instead of ?” This is referring
to a “robustness cliff,” where a model trained against an
 strong adversary has a sharp drop in robustness when
attacked by an adversary with a slightly larger budget. To
address this, we advocate for the slightly modified version
of typical adversarial training used in this work: rather than
picking a fixed  and running projected gradient descent,
we instead allow for an adversarial to have a range of  ∈
[min, max]. To do this, we begin with  = min, and then
gradually increase it by a multiplicative factor γ until either
an adversarial example is found or until max is reached.
While similar ideas have been used before for evaluating
model robustness, we specifically advocate for using this
schema during adversarial training. This has the advantage
of extending robustness of the classifier beyond a single 
threshold, allowing a model to achieve a potentially higher
robustness threshold while not being significantly harmed
by “impossible” adversarial examples.
C. Auxiliary experiments
In this section, we explore the space of possible parameters
that we treated as fixed in the main paper. While this is not
an exhaustive search, we hope to provide some intuition as
to why we chose the parameters we did.
C.1. Effect of λ and C
We first study the effect of λ and the cost matrix C. First,
note that λ could be any positive value. Furthermore, note
that to construct C we used the 2-norm which reflects the
1-Wasserstein metric, but in theory we could use any p-
Wasserstein metric, where the the cost of moving from pixel
(i, j) to (k, l) is
(|i− j|2 + |k − l|2)p/2. Figure 8 shows
the effects of λ and p on both the adversarial example and
the radius at which it was found for varying values of λ =
[1, 10, 100, 500, 1000] and p = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
We find that it is important to ensure that λ is large enough,
otherwise the projection of the image is excessively blurred.
In addition to qualitative changes, smaller λ seems to make
it harder to find Wasserstein adversarial examples, making
the  radius go up as λ gets smaller. In fact, for λ = (1, 10)
and almost all of λ = 100, the blurring is so severe that no
adversarial example can be found.
In contrast, we find that increasing p for the Wasserstein
distance used in the cost matrixC seems to make the images
more “blocky”. Specifically, as p gets higher tested, more
pixels seem to be moved in larger amounts. This seems to
counteract the blurring observed for low λ to some degree.
Naturally, the  radius also grows since the overall cost of
the transport plan has gone up.
C.2. Size of local transport plan
In this section we explore the effects of different sized trans-
port plans. In the main paper, we used a 5×5 local transport
plan, but this could easily be something else, e.g. 3× 3 or
7× 7. We can see a comparison on the robustness of a stan-
dard and the `∞ robust model against these different sized
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Figure 7. Adversarial accuracy of a standard model and a model
trained to be provably robust against `∞ attacks for different sizes
of transport plans. In most cases the size of the transport plan
doesn’t seem to matter, except for the 3× 3 local transport plan.
In this case, the adversary isn’t quite able to reach 0% accuracy for
the standard model, reaching 2.8% for for  = 1.83. The adversary
is also unable to attack the robust MNIST model, bottoming out at
41% adversarial accuracy at  = 1.83.
transport plans in Figure 7, using λ = 1000. We observe
that while 3 × 3 transport plans have difficulty attacking
the robust MNIST model, all other plan sizes seem to have
similar performance.
D. Provable defense
In this section we show how a Sinkhorn-like algorithm can
be derived for provable defenses, and that the resulting al-
gorithm is actually just a simplified version of the Projected
Sinkhorn iteration, which we call the Conjugate Sinkhorn
iteration (since it solves the conjugate problem).
D.1. Conjugate Sinkhorn iteration
By subtracting the same entropy term to the conjugate ob-
jective from Equation (14), we can get a problem similar to
that of projecting onto the Wasserstein ball.
minimize
z∈Rn+,Π∈Rn×n+
− λzT y +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij)
subject to Π1 = x
ΠT 1 = z
〈Π, C〉 ≤ .
(29)
where again we’ve multiplied the objective by λ for con-
venience. Following the same framework as before, we
introduce dual variables (α, β, ψ) where ψ ≥ 0, to con-
struct the Lagrangian as
L(z,Π, α, β, ψ)
=− λzT y +
∑
ij
Πij log(Πij) + ψ(〈Π, C〉 − )
+ αT (x−Π1) + βT (z −ΠT 1).
(30)
Note that since all the terms with Πij are the same, the
corresponding KKT optimality condition for Πij also re-
mains the same. The only part that changes is the optimality
condition for z, which becomes
β = λy (31)
Plugging the optimality conditions into the Lagrangian, we
get the following dual problem:
L(z∗,Π∗, α, β, ψ)
=− ψ+ αTx
−
∑
ij
exp(αi) exp(−ψCij − 1) exp(βj)
=g(α,ψ)
(32)
Finally, if we minimize this with respect to α and ψ we
get exactly the same update steps as the Projected Sinkhorn
iteration. Consequently, the Conjugate Sinkhorn iteration is
identical to the Projected Sinkhorn iteration except that we
replace the β step with the fixed value β = λy.
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Figure 8. A plot of the adversarial examples generated with different p-Wasserstein metrics used for the cost matrix C and different
regularization parameters λ. Note that when regularization is low, the image becomes blurred, and it is harder to find adversarial examples.
In contrast, changing p does not seem to make any significant changes.
